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Abstract
In many models of interdependent preferences the payoffs have not only per-
sonal value but also enter the social part of the utility. This duality creates a
problem of distinguishing what influences the choice more: consumption or social
concerns. To identify what drives the behavior it is necessary to have a model of
preferences that allows for unambiguous separation of personal and social compo-
nents. I use the preferences for consumption and status as an example to show
that the axioms in the paper describe the preferences that have unique expected
utility representation with consumption and social utilities entering additively.
This makes it possible to experimentally determine the nature of social prefer-
ences without ad hoc assumptions and to estimate whether consumption or social
value is more important in economic decisions.
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1 Introduction
There is an abundance of studies in experimental economics that investigate how the
behavior of subjects is influenced by the presence of others (Andreoni, 1995; Ball, Eckel,
Grossman, and Zame, 2001; Costa-Gomes and Zauner, 2001; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
To explain this behavior many models of utility which incorporates the characteristics
and possessions of other participants were proposed (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Levine, 1998). All these models follow the same logic. An assump-
tion is made about the nature of interdependence in preferences, for example, inequality
aversion or altruism, and then some parametric functional form is proposed with an
idea to find the estimates of the parameters from the experimental data. There are
several problems with this approach. First, in many experiments different assumptions
on the nature of interdependence generate the same behavior. For example, proposing
non-zero amount in the Ultimatum game can be explained by both inequality aversion
and altruism. Second, specific functions for personal and social utility are postulated
even though under the assumption of interdependent preferences it is not clear how to
disentangle the two. In order to do it the social utility should be completely eliminated
which requires that subject is observed in complete solitude which does not seem plau-
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sible.1 Third, the models above do not clearly address how uncertainty in the payoffs
enters interdependent preferences. The necessity for such specification becomes clear
when analyzing mixed strategies in games.
The important feature of most interdependent preferences models is that the pos-
sessions of the subject that enter personal utility also play role in social part of utility.
For example, higher income is enjoyed not only because it brings more consumption
but also because it increases the social rank. This duality creates a problem: when an
experimenter observes that subject prefers more payoff to less, is it because the subject
just likes it for consumption value or just because he values social rank above all? The
truth is probably somewhere in between, in which case the question is: How big a role
do consumption and rank play in the choice?
The goal of this paper is to build a model of interdependent preferences that addresses
the issues stated above. The purpose is to: 1) understand what kind of information about
the revealed choice is needed to uniquely separate consumption part of the preferences
from the social part; 2) derive the system of axioms that would allow for such separation;
and 3) create the framework that can be conveniently used to deal with uncertainty in
payoffs of all subjects when interdependent preferences are present.
The model can be used to separate any type of social preferences from personal
ones. To illustrate how it works I consider agents who care about consumption and
social rank or status. This choice was made for several reasons. At first, many authors
including Smith (1759), Veblen (1899) and Frank (1985) considered the desire for status
as the primal incentive for economic behavior once the subsistence level of consumption is
reached. From their perspective, the behavior below the subsistence level is driven mostly
by the desire for more consumption whereas above this level status plays the primary
role. The model in this paper can help with experimental testing of this hypothesis.
1This problem is like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in physics. To estimate the pure con-
sumption part of the utility, the subject should be observed choosing alone, which is impossible given
that experimenter himself can be considered one of the others.
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At second, there is growing evidence that envy and the resulting desire for status is
an evolutionary adaptation that exists not only in humans but also in other primates
(Cummins, 2005). Recent behavioral and fMRI studies confirm this. In the fMRI
experiment, Rustichini and Vostroknutov (2006b) find activation in Orbitofrontal Cortex
and Nucleus Accumbens2 when subjects compare their winnings with winnings of others
after playing a game of skill. In a related study (Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 2006a)
we find that subjects lost nearly half of total winnings by subtracting money from those
who won more than they did after the game of skill.
I use Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework to construct preferences that are
represented by unique3 expected utility function that is given by
U(x0, x1, ..., xT ) = f(x0) +
∑
i∈T
piiu(x0, xi)
on the certain outcomes. Here x0 is a measure of possessions of agent 0, whose preferences
are studied. (xi)i∈T are the same measures for other agents in subgroup T of some set S
of all possible others. Agent 0 cares about two things. First, x0 has some consumption
value. Second, agent 0 derives social value from x0 by comparing it to what others have.
The consumption part of the utility is represented by f(x0) whereas the status part is
the weighted sum over others. The function u(x0, x) describes the specific way agent 0
cares about his position relative to one other person and (pii)i∈T are the weights that
represent the importance or “closeness” of each other individual to agent 0. In order to
obtain uniqueness of this representation it is necessary that the preferences of agent 0
are observed in different subgroups of others.
Somewhat related construction can be found in Ok and Koc¸kesen (2000). In this
paper authors study the consequences of different assumptions about negatively interde-
2These areas are known to be involved in the representation of reward (Ernst, Nelson, Jazbec,
McClure, Monk, Leibenluft, Blair, and Pine, 2005; Rolls, 2004; Schultz, 2004).
3Up to a positive affine transformation
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pendent preferences. In their model agents have preferences only over certain outcomes
and all other agents have the same “closeness” weight. In comparison, I do not assume
that the interdependence is necessarily negative, preferences are constructed over lot-
teries and the “closeness” weights can be different. Ok and Koc¸kesen (2000) approach,
however, gives results that are hard to obtain in my framework. Their axioms allow
for the utility representation to depend on various aggregate possessions of others, like
average income. In my model this possibility depends on the observable subgroups of
others.
This paper is organized as follows. In part 2 I use the status example to talk about
some conceptual problems with the separability of social and personal parts of the prefer-
ences. In particular, it is argued why the additive functional form above is the appropri-
ate way to model interdependency. Part 3 starts with the description of the framework
and the issue of how to model uncertainty. In parts 4 and 5 the axioms and represen-
tation theorems are given for the two different uncertainty models. Part 6 concludes.
Proofs of the theorems and lemmata can be found in parts 7 and 8.
2 Separability of Status and Consumption
People choose to buy some goods purely for consumption purposes, for example cheap
food. Other things are chosen for purely status reasons, for example the choice between
going through some highly unpleasant initiation ritual in a fraternity and not doing so.
However, most goods are chosen for both reasons at once. A good example is cars.
People like cars because they are convenient. However, it can hardly be denied that
certain cars are produced and bought for status reasons as well (Hummer limousines).
When one wants to model the preferences involving status, it is, thus, important to
have consumption and status parts intertwined. How should these parts be represented?
Naturally, the consumption part of the preferences should be independent of anything
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related to others. It should depend only on the possessions of an agent himself. Let us
then denote consumption utility by Uc(x0). Status preferences should depend on what
others have as well as on the possessions of the agent himself. This is an important point
if we want to be consistent with the possible evolutionary explanations of status. People
care about others’ possessions only relative to their own. This implies that status utility
should be represented by a function Us(x0, others) which is not additively separable.
4
Now we can write the utility as
U(x0, others) = Uc(x0) + Us(x0, others).
I think of consumption and status as completely independent reasons that drive the
behavior. That is why Uc and Us are summed.
Here is a problem. Choose any function g(x0) and redefine the utility as
U(x0, others) = g(x0) + U¯s(x0, others)
where U¯s(x0, others) = Us(x0, others) + Uc(x0) − g(x0). It is clear that U¯s is still not
additively separable. But then any function g can be the utility for consumption!5 This
shows that, given intuitive restrictions on Us and Uc, it is impossible in principle to
separate status from consumption in a unique way if we observe preferences with an
unchanging group of people. One way out of this is to assume that we can observe the
choice of the agent when he cares separately about different subgroups of others. By
comparing observations from different subgroups it is possible to disentangle consump-
tion from status in a unique way.
To illustrate the intuition consider college students who choose whether or not to go
through a fraternity initiation ritual (for example, staying without sleep for three days).
4For otherwise we are back to the case of non-relative status.
5This trick can be performed even when consumption and status are not additive.
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When this choice is made, the students are among their peers and fraternity members.
If the only thing we observed was that the ritual is chosen by many students, we would
not be able to understand if students do it because they like it or because they care
about the position in the fraternity. However, it is clear that they would prefer not to
stay without sleep for so long while spending time with their families on Christmas. This
shows that their preferences over going through the initiation are purely status related:
their choice depends on the subgroup. To the contrary, if the students prefer, say, double
cheeseburgers over Big Macs, they will choose them regardless of the current subgroup
they are in (fraternity or family): their choice does not depend on the subgroup which
means that the choice is driven by consumption. These stories are on the extremes,
however, the same principle can be applied to any choice.
To separate consumption and status we need to observe preferences in more than one
subgroup. However, there is another problem. Consider the example with the fraternity,
the family and the ritual. Suppose that these two subgroups are disjoint. Then there are
two possible explanations of the behavior. First situation: the student cares a lot about
the fraternity members, who respect him for having no sleep, cares very little about
the family members,6 and dislikes having no sleep. In this case he will choose to go
through the initiation ritual while in the fraternity and not do it while at home. Second
situation: the student cares very little about the fraternity members, cares a lot about
the family members and loves having no sleep. In addition, having more sleep increases
his status among the family members. The behavior in this case will be exactly the same
as in the first situation, however, the explanations of the behavior are the opposites of
each other. One way to avoid this ambiguity is to assume monotonicity in personal
utility by postulating that the student does not like to have no sleep. However, I find
such assumptions undesirable as they prevent us from investigating other possibilities.
Another way is to try to observe the behavior in subgroups which intersect. In our
6Status-wise.
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example, this could be the requirement that the student has a brother who is in the
fraternity. So, the brother belongs to both subgroups. If such observations are possible,
then no additional assumptions on the personal utility are needed.
To summarize: the model constructed below give rise to the utility over consumption
and status that enter additively. This is necessary assumption if one thinks about
consumption and status as independent reasons for behavior. In order to uniquely
identify the utility it is necessary to observe the behavior in different subgroups of
others. Moreover, these groups should not be disjoint.
3 The Model
The world consists of agent 0 and a finite set S of other agents with |S| > 1. We are
interested in modeling the preferences of agent 0. Agent 0 and any other agent i ∈ S
have the measures of social status x0, x
i ∈ X. The measures can be some aggregates
that are calculated from the possessions or some qualities of the agents, depending on
the social group of interest. For example, it can be the money value of all the goods
that the agents have. The crucial assumption is that x0 plays dual role of bringing not
only consumption but also status utility.
Think of S as a “big” set of all people that agent 0 can possibly care about. This
can be, for example, people of the same profession, like all economists, or any other big
social group. It is realistic to assume that at any given time agent 0 does not take into
consideration everybody in S, but only some subset T ⊆ S. Agent 0 knows statuses
of people in T , but not those in S \T . Also, everybody in T have information about
the status of agent 0. It is possible that at some point agent 0 will be considering
different subset of agents, say R ⊆ S. This can happen, for example, if agent 0 moves
to a different city, which makes the information about his choices unavailable to the old
subgroup and information about the old subgroup unavailable to agent 0.
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For the model to be testable, it is necessary to have as few constraints on the sub-
groups observed as possible. For example, the model that requires that the choices in
any subgroup should be observed can be hardly tested (it is impossible to see the behav-
ior of an economist in any imaginable subgroup of other economists). As it was pointed
out in the section 2, in order to have unique description of the behavior it is necessary
to have intersecting subgroups. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 1. Say that the collection of observed subgroups C ⊆ 2S is connected if
{∅} /∈ C, |C| > 1, ∪C = S, and for all T,R ∈ C there exist C1, ..., Ck ∈ C such that
T ∩ C1 6= ∅, Ci ∩ Ci+1 6= ∅, Ck ∩R 6= ∅ where i = 1..k − 1.
The first three requirements say that 1) we do not observe the behavior of agent 0 in
complete solitude (the presence of observer himself makes it impossible); 2) there is more
than one subgroup (for otherwise we cannot uniquely separate status and consumption);
3) subgroups cover all other agents (if not, then remove unobserved agents from S) and
4) any two subgroups can be “connected” by the sequence of intersecting subgroups
(otherwise we would have “disconnected” collections of subgroups again making unique
identification impossible, see section 2).
3.1 Models of Uncertainty
Throughout the paper I assume that agent 0 has some unique way of caring about his
status relative to the status of any other person. The intuition is the following. Fix
some T ∈ C. Agent 0 encounters people from the subgroup T all the time. On meeting
i ∈ T , agent 0 observes some outcome (x0, x) ∈ X2 (or lottery), which represents what
agent 0 and the person i have. Agent 0 does not have a prior over the probabilities of
meeting others in T , all he knows is that he will meet somebody. This situation can
be conveniently modeled in the “horse lotteries” framework of Anscombe and Aumann
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(1963). The question however remains: What is the dependency between the outcome
that agent 0 gets and the identities of other agents? There are several intuitive ways of
defining it.
Let ∆(X2) be the set of all simple lotteries7 over the pairs of statuses (x0, x) ∈ X2.
Following Anscombe and Aumann (1963), let
HT := {h : T → ∆(X2)}
be the set of all horse lotteries. Here hi = h(i) is the assignment of a lottery over
agent 0’s and agent i’s statuses. Notice that agent 0’s status, measured by the marginal
lottery over x0 derived from any hi, depends on the identity of the other agent. This
interpretation can have a meaning in the situations where agent 0’s possessions and
status somehow depend on the characteristics of the person he meets.
It is natural, however, to think of agent 0’s outcome as independent of others. This
simply means that agent 0 compares some possessions or qualities of his to the posses-
sions or qualities of others, who cannot change the possessions of agent 0. Let µ0(hi)
denote the marginal distribution of x0 for any lottery in ∆(X
2). Consider the set of
horse lotteries
FT := {h ∈ HT : ∀i, j ∈ T µ0(hi) = µ0(hj)}. (3.1)
Each element of FT is an assignment of the distribution over x0 to agent 0 and some
distributions of statuses to all other agents. The distribution over x0 does not depend
on the identity of others. Agent 0 gets a lottery µ0(hi), which is the same for all i ∈ T .
7Lotteries with finite support.
9
4 The Space HT
4.1 Axioms
Choose any connected collection C ⊆ 2S of subgroups (see Definition 1) and let
A :=
⋃
T∈C
HT
be the set of all lotteries in HT in all available subsets of other agents. Consider prefer-
ence relation < over A with ∼ and  being its symmetric and asymmetric parts.
For T ∈ C and h ∈ HT write h = (hR, h−R)T to emphasize the lotteries corresponding
to agents in R ⊆ T . For ` ∈ ∆(X2) and x0, x ∈ X write `T or (x0, x)T for the horse
lottery that assigns lottery ` (or (x0, x)) to agent 0 and any other agent in T .
Define a mixture of two horse lotteries h, z ∈ HT with the same domain T to be
αh+ (1− α)z = (αhi + (1− α)zi)i∈T ∈ HT . (4.1)
This turns HT into a mixture set as defined in Herstein and Milnor (1953).
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Suppose that the following axioms hold:
A1 < is reflexive, transitive, total.9 It is also non-trivial: for any T ∈ C there are
x0, x, x
′ ∈ X such that
(x0, x)T  (x0, x′)T
A2 Independence. For all T ∈ C, all p, q, r ∈ HT and all α ∈ (0, 1)
p  q ⇒ αp+ (1− α)r  αq + (1− α)r
8See Lemma 1 for the proof.
9Totality: a 6= b⇒ [a < b ∨ b < a].
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A3 Continuity. For all T ∈ C, all p, q, r ∈ HT there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
p  q  r ⇒ αp+ (1− α)r  q  βp+ (1− β)r
A4 Anonymity. For all T ∈ C, h ∈ HT , i, j ∈ T , and `,m ∈ ∆(X2)
(`, h−i)T < (m,h−i)T ⇐⇒ (`, h−j)T < (m,h−j)T
A5 Unimportance. For all x0 ∈ X there exists x∗(x0) ∈ X such that for all intersecting
T,R ∈ C, all Q ∈ T ∩R and all x ∈ X
((x0, x
∗(x0))T\Q, (x0, x)Q) ∼ ((x0, x∗(x0))R\Q, (x0, x)Q)
A6 Group Disparity. There exist S1, S2 ∈ C such that for all x0, x, x′ ∈ X with
(x0, x)S1 ∼ (x0, x)S2
(x0, x
′)S1  (x0, x)S1 ⇒ (x0, x′)S1  (x0, x′)S2 and
(x0, x)S1  (x0, x′)S1 ⇒ (x0, x′)S2  (x0, x′)S1
***
Axioms A1-A3 are standard necessary conditions for existence of an expected utility
representation for each T ∈ C.
Axiom A4 says that agent 0 does not care about the names of the other agents. Given
any fixed outcomes for all agents but i, if agent 0 prefers lottery ` to m then he will also
prefer ` to m in a situation when he faces agent j instead of i with all other outcomes
still being fixed. Together with the axioms above, A4 implies that in each restriction
<T agent 0 treats all other agents in T in the same way. The only difference comes from
the weights he attaches to different agents. These weights describe the relative “social”
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closeness of others to agent 0, whereas being in subgroup T incorporates the idea of
“topological” closeness.
A4 puts restrictions on what can happen inside each subgroup T . The rest of the
axioms deal with what happens between different subgroups. Without A5-A6 any two
restrictions <T and <R are completely unrelated. It is desirable, however, that agent 0
choose somewhat consistently in different subgroups.
For each level of status x0 of agent 0, axiom A5 asks for the existence of special status
level x∗(x0) of any agent i, such that agent 0, when facing the outcome (x0, x∗(x0)), does
not care about i and chooses as if i does not exist. For example, agent 0 might not care
about others as long as they have no status or possessions at all (x∗(x0) = 0), but he
starts taking them into account once they have more than that.
Axiom A6 requires that there exist two subgroups T,R ∈ C to which agent 0 at-
taches different total social weight. In particular, if for some (x0, x) it so happens that
(x0, x)T ∼ (x0, x)R, then if agent 0 prefers having (x0, x′)T to (x0, x)T then he prefers
it also over (x0, x
′)R. This means that subgroup T is preferable to subgroup R only
because agent 0 likes having agents T around more than agents R. A counterexample
might be the situation when all subgroups in C have the same number of others and the
same social weights are attached to all of them. In this case we will have hT ∼ hR for
all h ∈ HT and any T,R ∈ C, which leads to the indeterminacy of status component of
the preferences. Axiom A6 is necessary when there are no two subgroups in C such that
one is the strict subset of the other. If such subgroups exist, then A6 can be dropped
without consequences.
There is no axiom that explicitly describes the “statusness” of the preferences. This
is so because such an axiom is not required for the derivation of the utility. Therefore,
this construction of preferences can be used for any types of interdependent preferences.
The status axiom might look like this:
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Status Monotonicity. For all T ∈ C, h ∈ HT , i ∈ T and x0, x, x′ ∈ X
x′ ≥ x ⇒ ((x0, x), h−i)T < ((x0, x′), h−i)T
It states that if we choose any agent i ∈ T and fix the horse lottery outcomes for all
other agents, then agent 0 weakly prefers having less of x for agent i. This reflects the
observation that people dislike others with bigger status.
4.2 Utility Representation
Two theorems in this section state that < satisfies A1-A6 if and only if there is a utility
representation of the form (4.2). The proofs are provided for the space HT . Notice that
the restriction of this utility to the subspace FT gives the desired consumption-status
additive utility
U [(x0, x
i)T ] = f(x0) +
∑
i∈T
piiu(x0, x
i)
Definition 2. Call any u : X2 → R a status function if it is not constant and there
is a function x∗ : X → X such that u(x0, x∗(x0)) ≡ 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose that < satisfies A1-A6. Then there are positive numbers (pii)i∈S,
a function f : X → R and a status function u : X2 → R such that for any T ∈ C and
any h, z ∈ HT
h < z ⇐⇒ UT [h] ≥ UT [z]
where
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
f(x0)
σT
+ u(x0, x)dhi(x0, x) (4.2)
and σT =
∑
i∈T pii.
Moreover, the function U : A→ R defined as U [h] = UT [h] for all T ∈ C and h ∈ HT ,
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is the utility representation for <, unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. See Section 7.
Theorem 2. Fix any C as described in the Definition 1 and suppose that f : X → R
is any function, u : X2 → R is a status function, and (pii)i∈S are positive numbers. For
T ∈ C and h ∈ HT let
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
f(x0)
σT
+ u(x0, x)dhi(x0, x)
Define U : A → R to be U [h] = UT [h]. If there are two subgroups S1, S2 ∈ C such
that
∑
i∈S1
pii 6=
∑
i∈S2
pii (4.3)
then the preference relation < over A generated by U satisfies A1-A6.
Proof. See Section 7.
5 The Space FT
In this section I restrict the space of possible horse lotteries to FT (see the equation
(3.1) above). In subgroup T in each horse lottery agent 0 now always has the same
marginal distribution over x0 for all other agents in T . This represents the idea that
the possessions of agent 0 are independent of those of other agents. The space FT is
much smaller than HT but is still a mixture set. It turns out that it is impossible
to construct a weight-additive utility of the form (8.1) for subgroup T using only the
axioms like A1-A4. This happens because Anonymity Axiom (A4), reformulated for FT ,
cannot compare arbitrary simple lotteries from ∆(X2) keeping the rest of agents fixed,
as this restricts the comparison to only the lotteries with the same marginals over x0.
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The solution to this problem lies in finding an additional assumption that would make
it possible to “compare” any two lotteries in some way.
5.1 Axioms
I will abuse notation and use the same symbol < for the preferences over new space in
this section. This does not create any notational issues as all the results in this paper
refer to only one type of space at a time.
Choose any connected collection of subgroups C ⊆ 2S and let
AF :=
⋃
T∈C
FT
be all horse lotteries in FT in all available subgroups. Consider preference relation <
over AF with ∼ and  being its symmetric and asymmetric parts.
For T ∈ C and µ ∈ ∆(X) write hµ ∈ FT to emphasize that the marginal distribution
over agent 0 possessions is the same for all i ∈ T and is equal to µ: ∀i ∈ T µ0(hµi ) = µ.
Also write `µ ∈ ∆(X2) to emphasize that µ0(`µ) = µ.
In order to express additional axiom I need the following definition.
Definition 3. Say that the correspondence Θ : ∆(X2) ⇒ ∆(X2) is ubiquitous if for
all `,m ∈ ∆(X2) and α ∈ (0, 1)
U1) ` ∈ Θ(`)
U2) µ0[Θ(`)] = ∆(X),
10
U3) m ∈ Θ(`) ⇒ ` ∈ Θ(m)
U4) ∀`∗ ∈ Θ(`) ∀m∗ ∈ Θ(m) α`∗+(1−α)m∗ ∈ Θ(α`+(1−α)m)
Suppose that the following axioms hold.
10For A ⊆ ∆(X2), µ0[A] is {µ0(a) : a ∈ A}.
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AF1, AF2, AF3 The same as A1-A3 only with FT in place of HT
AF4 Anonymity. For all T ∈ C, µ ∈ ∆(X), hµ ∈ FT , i, j ∈ T , and `µ,mµ ∈ ∆(X2)
(`µ, hµ−i)T < (mµ, hµ−i)T ⇐⇒ (`µ, hµ−j)T < (mµ, hµ−j)T
AF5, AF6 The same as A5 and A6
AF7 Complete Substitutability. For all T ∈ C there exists a ubiquitous correspondence
ΘT such that for all h ∈ FT , µ ∈ ∆(X), and all zµ ∈ ×i∈TΘT (hi)
h ∼ zµ
***
There are two axioms that carry different meaning in comparison with the previ-
ous set of axioms for HT . First, Anonymity Axiom AF4 now states that < is agent
independent only inside each given marginal distribution over x0, but not across them.
This makes the standard subjective probability arguments fail to prove that weighted-
additive utility exists. Second, Complete Substitutability Axiom AF7 says that for any
horse lottery hν with fixed amount of possessions ν ∈ ∆(X) for the agent 0 and any
other amount of his possessions, µ ∈ ∆(X), it is possible to find the levels of statuses of
others zµ such that agent 0 is indifferent between hν and zµ. Moreover, given any two
components i, j ∈ T of the horse lotteries, agent 0 indifference is the same component-
wise (since the same correspondence ΘT works for any i). So, agent 0 is always ready to
substitute some wealth for some status in the same way for any component i and any
change in possessions.
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5.2 Utility Representation
The goal is to show the existence of the expected utility
UT [h
µ] =
∫
X
f(x0)dµ(x0) +
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
u(x0, x)dh
µ
i (x0, x).
with unique f , u, and (pii)i∈S for any T ∈ C. The main challenge with the space FT is
to show the existence of the weighted-additive expected utility
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
piiT
∫
X2
u¯T (x0, x)dhi(x0, x)
with function u¯T unique for each T . Once this is done the rest of the proof is the same
as for the HT case.
As I mentioned above, it is impossible to use standard subjective probability results
for this case. Therefore, another way of constructing the utility should be used. Let us
define some new notation. For any µ ∈ ∆(X) let
Xµ := {h ∈ FT : µ0(h1) = µ}.
Xµ is the set of all horse lotteries with marginal distribution over x0 being µ. Notice
that FT = ∪µ∈∆(X)Xµ.
Complete Substitutability leads to the following result: for any µ and ν in ∆(X) the
preference < generates “the same” order on Xµ and Xν once “sameness” is appropriately
defined. To be more specific, fix T ∈ C and consider any Xµ ⊆ FT with the order
generated by <. Debreu (1983) defines natural topology on Xµ as any topology in which
both upper and lower contour sets are open for all h ∈ Xµ.11 Call the coarsest natural
topology the order topology. The subbasis of the order topology consists only of all upper
and lower contour sets (Eilenberg, 1941). Endow Xµ with the order topology τµ and
11Upper contour set for h ∈ Xµ is {z ∈ Xµ : z  h}. Lower contour set is {z ∈ Xµ : h  z}.
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find the quotient space Xµ/∼. Let τ ?µ be the quotient topology on Xµ/∼ derived from
τµ. Now, we say that two orders on Xµ and Xν are equivalent if it is possible to find
bijective order and topology preserving map between spaces (Xµ/∼, τ ?µ) and (Xν/∼, τ ?ν ).
Theorem 3. Suppose AF7 holds. Then for any T ∈ C and any µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) there exists
an order preserving homeomorphism (Xµ/∼, τ ?µ) 7→ (Xν/∼, τ ?ν ).
Proof. See Section 7.
The Theorem essentially says that given AF7 the preference < generates the same
order on all Xµ ∈ FT regardless of µ. So we can choose one µ, say some degenerate
distribution x0 ∈ X, continue constructing utility on Xx0 and then extend the utility
function to all other elements of FT .
Theorem 4. Suppose AF1-AF4 and AF7 hold. Then for any T ∈ C there are positive
numbers (piiT )i∈T and a function u¯T : X
2 → R such that
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
piiT
∫
X2
u¯T (x0, x)dhi(x0, x)
is a utility representation for <T on FT unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. See Section 7.
Now we are ready to give main representation theorems of this section. They are
different from those for the case HT as Complete Substitutability (AF7) imposes restric-
tions on the shape of the admittable utility functions.
Definition 4. Say that a function u¯ : X2 → R is equispread if for all x0, y0 ∈ X
sup{u¯(x0, X)} = sup{u¯(y0, X)} and inf{u¯(x0, X)} = inf{u¯(y0, X)}.
Theorem 5. Suppose that < satisfies AF1-AF7. Then there are positive numbers
(pii)i∈S, a function f : X → R and a status function u : X2 → R such that for any
T ∈ C and any h, z ∈ FT
h < z ⇐⇒ UT [h] ≥ UT [z]
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where
UT [h
µ] =
∫
X
f(x0)dµ(x0) +
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
u(x0, x)dh
µ
i (x0, x) (5.1)
and for all T ∈ C the function f(x0)/σT + u(x0, x) is equispread where σT =
∑
i∈T pii.
Moreover, the function U : A→ R defined as U [h] = UT [h] for all T ∈ C and h ∈ FT ,
is the expected utility representation for <, unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. See Section 7.
Theorem 6. Fix any C as described in the Definition 1 and suppose that f : X → R
is any function, u : X2 → R is a status function, and (pii)i∈S are positive numbers. For
T ∈ C and hµ ∈ FT let
UT [h
µ] =
∫
X
f(x0)dµ(x0) +
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
u(x0, x)dh
µ
i (x0, x).
Define U : A → R to be U [h] = UT [h]. If all functions f(x0)/σT + u(x0, x) are
equispread and there are two subgroups S1, S2 ∈ C such that
∑
i∈S1
pii 6=
∑
i∈S2
pii (5.2)
then the preference relation < over A generated by U satisfies AF1-AF7.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 applies exactly with replacing all occurrences of axioms
A# with AF#. Axiom AF7 follows from the Lemma 8. 
6 Conclusion
The model of preferences constructed in this paper shows that it is possible to sepa-
rate consumption preferences from social preferences. In order to do so one needs to
observe the choices people make in different subgroups. This creates the possibility to
experimentally find out what social preferences are without making ad hoc assumptions.
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The next step in this research is to design an experiment or find the data which would
help to understand the relative importance of social and personal components of prefer-
ences. The first step is to check whether the axioms proposed in this paper hold. The
experiment in question is not beyond one’s imagination. It is not hard to observe how
behavior changes in different subgroups. To give the simplest example, think of how
people behave differently being at work among colleagues or at home among relatives.
It should be relatively easy to test the axioms experimentally by making various pieces
of information on the outcomes available to different subjects during one treatment.
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7 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The idea of the proof is to 1) establish the existence of the
weighted-additive utilities UT for all T ∈ C; 2) show that a unique function f can be
constructed in a way that is consistent with each of the utility functions; 3) rescale the
now redefined utility functions to show that all the utilities can have the specific form
described in the Theorem.
Fix any T ∈ C. Then A1-A3 and the fact that HT is a mixture set imply existence
of the expected utility UT : HT → R, unique up to a positive affine transformation
(Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970)). Lemma 2 shows that UT on the certain outcomes has
the weighted-additive form
UT [(x
i
0, x
i)T ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T (x
i
0, x
i).
Now by Lemma 5 the assertion of the Theorem is true. 
Proof of Theorem 2. A1 holds since u is a status function, which is assumed to be
not constant. For any T ∈ C A2-A3 hold by the “only if” part of the Theorem 8.4 of
Fishburn (1970). Additivity of UT immediately implies A4. The assumption that u is a
status function implies that for each x0 there is x
∗(x0) such that u(x0, x∗(x0)) = 0, so
A5 follows. It is left to show that A6 holds. Without loss of generality assume that
∑
i∈S1
pii >
∑
i∈S2
pii
where S1 and S2 are as in the description of this Theorem. Suppose for some (x0, x) ∈ X2
we have U [(x0, x)S1 ] = U [(x0, x)S2 ]. Then
∑
i∈S1
piiu(x0, x) =
∑
i∈S2
piiu(x0, x)
21
can happen only when u(x0, x) = 0 since we assume (4.3). Now, take any x
′ such that
U [(x0, x
′)S1 ] > U [(x0, x)S1 ]. This implies that u(x0, x
′) > u(x0, x) = 0. But then
∑
i∈S1
piiu(x0, x
′) >
∑
i∈S2
piiu(x0, x
′)
and therefore U [(x0, x
′)S1 ] > U [(x0, x
′)S2 ]. This is the first part of A6. Second part is
proved by the exactly same argument. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a mapping Ψµν : (Xµ/∼, τ ?µ)→ (Xν/∼, τ ?ν ) that takes
equivalence class [h] to equivalence class [z] whenever h ∼ z. Notice that (Xµ/∼,) and
(Xν/∼,) are linearly ordered sets. By Lemma 6, Ψµν is the order preserving bijection,
so Ψµν = Ψ
−1
νµ . By Lemma 7, τ
?
µ and τ
?
ν are the order topologies, so Ψ
−1
νµ takes any upper
(lower) contour set of Xµ/∼, which is open, to upper (lower) contour set of Xν/∼, which
is also open. Therefore, since Ψ−1νµ is a bijection, any open set in the basis of τ
?
µ goes
to the open set in the basis of τ ?ν . This immediately implies that any open set in τ
?
µ is
mapped by Ψ−1νµ to an open set in τ
?
ν . Thus Ψνµ = Ψ
−1
µν is continuous.
12 By the same
argument Ψµν = Ψ
−1
νµ is continuous. Thus Ψµν is an order preserving homeomorphism.

Proof of Theorem 4. Fix any T ∈ C and x0 ∈ X. AF1-AF4 imply that there is
weighted-additive expected utility on Xx0 of the form
UT [h
x0 ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T [h
x0
i ] (7.1)
where (piiT ) are positive weights and u¯T [h
x0
i ] stands for an expectation of u¯T with respect
to hx0i (Theorem 13.2 of Fishburn (1970)).
12This argument is based on the fact that the image of a finite intersection (arbitrary union) of any
sets is equal to the finite intersection (arbitrary union) of images under a bijective map.
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Now, for any µ ∈ ∆(X) extend UT to Xµ by setting
UT [h
µ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T [h
µ
i ] (7.2)
where u¯T [h
µ
i ] = u¯T [z
x0
i ] for any z
x0
i ∈ ΘT (hµi ) ,which is non-empty by the ubiquitousness
of ΘT . The choice of u¯T [h
µ
i ] here is unambiguous since AF7 guarantees that u¯T [z
x0
i ] =
u¯T [p
x0
i ] for all p
x0
i ∈ ΘT (zx0i ).13 Now, by Theorem 3 the order on Xx0 is homeomorphic
to the order on Xµ for any µ ∈ ∆(X), thus this procedure defines UT for all elements of
Xµ and since µ was arbitrary, for all elements of FT .
The utility UT : FT → R constructed in this way conforms with AF4 and AF7. The
only thing left to check is that UT indeed represents <T and that it has expected utility
form. These properties follow from the fact that UT satisfies them by construction when
restricted to Xx0 .
Indeed, fix any h, z ∈ FT with h < z. Let hx0 ∈ ×i∈TΘT (hi) and zx0 ∈ ×i∈TΘT (zi)
be horse lotteries in Xx0 . Then
h < z
AF7
⇐⇒ hx0 < zx0
(7.1)
⇐⇒ UT [hx0 ] ≥ UT [zx0 ]
(7.2)
⇐⇒ UT [h] ≥ UT [z]
The first equivalence works by definition of AF7 and ΘT ; second, because UT restricted
to Xx0 is a utility representation (7.1); third, by construction (7.2). Therefore UT on FT
is a utility function for <T .
It is still left to show that UT on FT is expected utility function. To do that it is
enough to show that for all `,m ∈ ∆(X2) and α ∈ (0, 1)
u¯T [α`+ (1− α)m] = αu¯T [`] + (1− α)u¯T [m].
13In the definition of AF7 fix zx0 , let µ = x0 and apply ΘT to only ith component leaving the rest
unchanged (which we can always do since ` ∈ ΘT (`) for any `).
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Fix any (α` + (1 − α)m)x0 ∈ ΘT (α` + (1 − α)m), `x0 ∈ ΘT (`), and mx0 ∈ ΘT (m). By
property U4 of Definition 3
α`x0 + (1− α)mx0 ∈ ΘT (α`+ (1− α)m)
which implies
u¯T [α`
x0 + (1− α)mx0 ] = u¯T [(α`+ (1− α)m)x0 ]
But uT on Xx0 does have expected utility property by construction (7.1). Therefore,
αu¯T [`
x0 ] + (1− α)u¯T [mx0 ] = u¯T [(α`+ (1− α)m)x0 ]
which by definition of utility (7.2) implies
αu¯T [`] + (1− α)u¯T [m] = u¯T [α`+ (1− α)m].
This finishes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5. By Theorem 4 <T for each T ∈ C has the utility representation
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
piiT
∫
X2
u¯T (x0, x)dhi(x0, x).
By Lemma 5 we can rewrite these utilities as
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
f(x0)
σT
+ u(x0, x)dhi(x0, x)
for all T ∈ C such that U as defined above is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
By the nature of FT (each horse lottery has the same marginal distributions on x0) the
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above becomes
UT [h
µ] =
∫
X
f(x0)dµ(x0) +
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
u(x0, x)dh
µ
i (x0, x).
By Lemma 8 all functions f(x0)/σT + u(x0, x) are equispread. 
8 Lemmata
Lemma 1. For all T ∈ C the sets HT and FT as defined in part 3.1 are mixture sets.
Proof. Fix any T . For any two horse lotteries h and z from either HT or FT let
αh+ (1− α)z = (αhi + (1− α)zi)i∈T
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. First it is necessary to show that the mixture of h and z stays in the
set from which they came from. Then we need to show that the definition of mixture
satisfies conditions (1-3) of Herstein and Milnor (1953).
For h, z ∈ HT the mixture is trivially in HT . For FT this is true since the marginal
distributions of T mixtures of pairs of lotteries with the same marginals on x0 are still
the same, thus by definition mixture is in FT . The conditions (1-3) of Herstein and
Milnor (1953) for mixture set are trivially satisfied since we are mixing independent
probability distributions. 
Lemma 2. Suppose that < satisfies A1-A4. Then for any T ∈ C, the restricted prefer-
ence relation <T , defined over HT , has expected utility representation of the form
UT [(x
i
0, x
i)T ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T (x
i
0, x
i)
where piiT > 0 for all i ∈ T . Moreover, UT is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. Fix any T ⊆ C and consider the restriction <T . A1-A3 still hold for <T .
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Now notice that by condition (4.1) HT is a mixture set. A1-A3 are exactly the
requirements of Theorem 13.1 of Fishburn (1970).14 The first condition of Theorem 13.2
follows from the non-triviality of <T and A4. The second condition of the theorem is
exactly A4. Therefore, expected utility representation UT obtains. 
Lemma 3. Suppose A5-A6 (AF5-AF6) hold. Then for all C1, C2 ∈ C, all x0 ∈ X and
all x∗(x0) ∈ X satisfying A5 (AF5)
(x0, x
∗(x0))C1 ∼ (x0, x∗(x0))C2
Proof. Let us first assume that C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅. Then by putting x = x∗(x0) in the
definition of A5 (AF5) we get the desired
(x0, x
∗(x0))C1 ∼ (x0, x∗(x0))C2
Now, C is the connected collection of subsets (see Definition 1). Therefore, any two
disjoint subgroups can be connected by the sequence of intersecting ones. Therefore, by
transitivity of ∼ the result above holds for all C1, C2 ∈ C. 
Lemma 4. Suppose A5-A6 (AF5-AF6) hold. Then for all x0 ∈ X there exists a non-
empty set
X∗x0 = {x ∈ X : ∀T,R ∈ C (x0, x)T ∼ (x0, x)R}.
Moreover, for all x0 ∈ X, x, y ∈ X∗x0 and all T ∈ C
(x0, x)T ∼ (x0, y)T
Proof. A5 (AF5) says that for all x0 ∈ X there is x∗(x0), which by Lemma 3 satisfies
the condition for being a member of X∗x0 . Therefore, we have shown that non-empty
14To verify that  is a weak order see Proposition 2.4 of Kreps (1988).
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X∗x0 exists for all x0.
Now suppose that the second condition of the Lemma does not hold. In other words,
there is x0 and x, y ∈ X∗x0 such that for some T ∈ C
(x0, x)T  (x0, y)T
Let S1, S2 ∈ C be the two subgroups satisfying A6 (AF6). Then, by definition of y
(x0, y)S1 ∼ (x0, y)S2
Moreover, the definitions of x and y and the assumption give
(x0, x)S1 ∼ (x0, x)T  (x0, y)T ∼ (x0, y)S1
The two conditions above and A6 (AF6) imply that
(x0, x)S1  (x0, x)S2
which contradicts the fact that x is an element of X∗x0 . 
Lemma 5. For the space HT (FT ) suppose that <T admits an expected utility represen-
tation that on the certain outcomes is given by
UT [(x
i
0, x
i)T ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T (x
i
0, x
i)
(
UT [(x0, x
i)T ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT u¯T (x0, x
i)
)
(8.1)
for each T ∈ C and A5-A6 (AF5-AF6) hold for <. Then the statement of Theorem 1
(Theorem 5) is true.
Proof.
1. Lemma 4 says that for any x0 there exists a non-empty set X
∗
x0
which consists of
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all the points x ∈ X∗x0 such that for all T,R ∈ C (x0, x)T ∼ (x0, x)R. Moreover,
for all x, y ∈ X∗x0 and all T ∈ C we have (x0, x)T ∼ (x0, y)T .15 The pairs in X∗x0
are perfect candidates for the representation of the pure consumption value of x0:
agent 0 does not care to which subgroup he belongs when choosing among pairs
from sets X∗x0 . Let
X∗ :=
⋃
x0∈X
{(x0, x) ∈ X2 : x ∈ X∗x0}.
Notice that the choice between any two pairs (x0, x), (y0, y) ∈ X∗ depends only on
x0 and y0 and nothing else. In terms of the utilities defined on the previous step,
we have
UT [(x0, x)T ] = UT [(x0, y)T ] = UR[(x0, x)R]
for all (x0, x), (x0, y) ∈ X∗, all T,R ∈ C.
Define f : X → R to be
f(x0) := UT [(x0, x)T ]
for any x ∈ X∗x0 and any T ∈ C and rewrite UT as
UT [(x
i
0, x
i)T ] =
∑
i∈T
piiT
(f(xi0)
σT
+ uT (x
i
0, x
i)
)
(8.2)
where uT (x0, x) = u¯T (x0, x) − f(x0)/σT , σT =
∑
i∈T pi
i
T and uT (x0, x) = 0 for all
(x0, x) ∈ X∗.16
2. Fix i ∈ S and consider all subgroups C1, ..., Ck ∈ C to which i belongs. Then A5
15Lemma 4 makes sure that there are no other points outside X∗x0 that satisfy these conditions. Thus,
X∗x0 is the biggest “unique” set with these properties.
16Notice that if all xi0 are the same, then UT becomes f(x0) +
∑
i∈T pi
i
TuT (x0, x
i).
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(AF5) with Q = {i} implies that for all (x0, x) ∈ X2
((x0, x)i, (x0, x
∗(x0))−i)C1 ∼ ... ∼ ((x0, x)i, (x0, x∗(x0))−i)Ck
Therefore,
f(x0) + pi
i
C1
uC1(x0, x) = ... = f(x0) + pi
i
Ck
uCk(x0, x)
implying
piiC1uC1(x0, x) = pi
i
C2
uC2(x0, x) = ... = pi
i
Ck
uCk(x0, x) (8.3)
for all (x0, x) ∈ X2.
Now fix some T,R ∈ C such that there are i, j ∈ T ∩R. Then by the above
piiTuT (x0, x) = pi
i
RuR(x0, x) (8.4)
pijTuT (x0, x) = pi
j
RuR(x0, x) (8.5)
By A1 (AF1) the preferences < are non-trivial on all subgroups. So there is
(y0, y) ∈ X2 such that uT (y0, y) 6= 0. The connectedness of C, positiveness of (piiT )
and (8.3) implies then that uC(y0, y) 6= 0 for all C ∈ C.
The equations (8.4-8.5) hold for (y0, y). So, by dividing them we obtain
piiT
piiR
=
pijT
pijR
=: LT,R (8.6)
for all intersecting T,R and all i, j ∈ T ∩R. If T ∩R has only one element i, then
set
piiT
piiR
=: LT,R
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Notice as well that for L > 017
∑
i∈T
piiT
(f(xi0)
σT
+ uT (x
i
0, x
i)
)
=
∑
i∈T
piiT
L
(f(xi0)
σT/L
+ LuT (x
i
0, x
i)
)
(8.7)
For intersecting T,R we can rescale all the weights (piiT ) and uT using LT,R in place
of L in (8.7). This makes the weights for all i ∈ T ∩ R equal in both subgroups.
Also rescaled uT becomes equal to uR. Denote this rescaled UT by LT,R(UT ).
3. C can be represented as a graph. Let all elements of C be nodes. Two nodes C1, C2
are connected by an edge if C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅. By definition of C the resulting finite
graph G is connected.18
For each node C ∈ G there corresponds a collection of weights (piiC) and a status
function uC . Call 〈G, {(piiC), uC}C∈G〉 a graph structure.
Choose any nodes (T, (piiT ), uT ) and (R, (pi
i
R), uR) connected by an edge. Rescale
UT to LT,R(UT ) and contract the two nodes into one node (T ∪ R, (piiT∪R), uT∪R),
where uT∪R = uR.
This turns the structure 〈G, {(piiC), uC}C∈G〉 into the structure
〈G1, {((piiT∪R), uT∪R), ((piiC), uC)}C∈G\{T,R}〉
where G1 is a minor of G obtained by the contraction of an edge between T and
R.
Continue contracting edges until there are none left. The sequence of graph struc-
tures thus obtained is finite and its last element 〈GN , (piiS), uS〉 has one node and
no edges. By construction, for any agent i ∈ S the weight piiS is the same in all
subgroups i belongs to. The status function uS is also same in all subgroups. Let
17For the case of the space FT remove indexes i from all occurences of xi0.
18See the definitions of all graph theoretic terms in Diestel (2000).
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pii = pi
i
S and u = uS, then we obtain desired utility U : A→ R defined on each HT
or FT as
UT [h] =
∑
i∈T
pii
∫
X2
f(x0)
σT
+ u(x0, x)dhi(x0, x)
Each UT is unique up to a positive affine transformation. In addition, all functions
UT are restricted by A5 (AF5) to have the same weights and status functions.
Thus the whole U is unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
Lemma 6. Suppose AF7 holds. Then for any T ∈ C, all µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) and all h ∈ Xµ
there is z ∈ Xν such that h ∼T z.
Proof. By AF7 the correspondence ΘT is ubiquitous (see Definition 3). This means
that for any h ∈ FT and any i ∈ T the set ΘT (hi) ⊆ ∆(X2) contains some lotteries
whose marginal distribution over x0 is any ν. Therefore, the set
{z ∈ ×i∈TΘT (hi) : ∀i ∈ T µ0(ΘT (hi)) = ν} ⊆ Xν
is not empty. By AF7 any element of this set is indifferent to h. 
Lemma 7. For any T ∈ C and any µ ∈ ∆(X) the quotient topology τ ?µ is the order
topology on Xµ/∼.
Proof. The quotient map [·] : (Xµ, τµ)→ (Xµ/∼, τ ?µ) takes open sets to open. Therefore,
[·] maps any upper contour set to the open upper contour set in Xµ/∼. The same is
true for lower contour sets. But then these contour sets form the subbasis of the order
topology on Xµ/∼. Therefore, the quotient topology τ ?µ is no coarser than the order
topology on Xµ/∼. Suppose that it is actually strictly finer. Then, there exists an open
set A ∈ τ ?µ that is not a finite intersection and/or arbitrary union of the images of upper
and lower contour sets under [·]. But [·] is continuous, thus there should exist an open
inverse image of A in Xµ, which is also not a finite intersection and/or arbitrary union
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of upper and lower contour sets. This contradicts the assumption that τµ is the order
topology. 
Lemma 8. Suppose that for T ∈ C there is an expected utility function that represents
<T and on the certain outcomes it is given by UT [(x0, xi)T ] =
∑
i∈T pi
i
T u¯T (x0, x
i). Then
u¯T is equispread (Definition 4) if and only if AF7 holds.
Proof. [AF7 ⇒ equispread]. Suppose that AF7 holds for <T on T ∈ C and there
is expected utility UT with u¯T being not equispread. Then there are x0, y0 ∈ X such
that either sup{u¯T (x0, X)} > sup{u¯T (y0, X)} or inf{u¯T (x0, X)} < inf{u¯T (y0, X)}. In
case of supremum take any x ∈ X with u¯T (x0, x) > sup{u¯T (y0, X)}. It is clear that
for no `y0 ∈ ∆(X2) is it true that u¯T [`y0 ] = u¯T (x0, x). This contradicts AF7 and the
fact that UT is utility function as Lemma 6 states that there should exist `
y0 with
u¯T [`
y0 ] = u¯T (x0, x). The case of infimum is treated similarly.
[Equispread ⇒ AF7]. Suppose u¯T is equispread and fix a real number r such
that inf{u¯T (x0, X)} ≤ r ≤ sup{u¯T (x0, X)}.19 Take any x0 and find some x, y ∈ X
such that u¯T (x0, x) ≤ r ≤ u¯T (x0, y). Then it is possible to find α ∈ [0, 1] such that
αu¯T (x0, x) + (1 − α)u¯T (x0, y) = r. Thus we found a lottery which has utility r. This
procedure can be performed for arbitrary x0 and any r. It is also possible to find a
lottery with utility r for any marginal distribution [αk, x
k
0] ∈ ∆(X) on x0 by just taking
the lotteries with marginal distributions xk0 which have utility r and combining them
with appropriate probabilities αk. Thus for any r between infimum and supremum and
any µ ∈ ∆(X) we can find a lottery hµ with u¯T [hµ] = r. Construct ΘT by mapping each
point in ∆(X2) to the subset of ∆(X2) of points with the same utility. It is trivial to
check that ΘT is ubiquitous and that AF7 holds. 
19Any x0 here is fine by assumption of equispreadness.
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